I would ask anyone involved in the NICE guideline amendments to watch this sub-30 minute documentary on the Boeing 737 Max, because there are so many strong parallels that just jump out at you
@Barry I have no safety engineering background, but I am an engineer first, and a physiologist second. Like you, I've followed the 737 Max debacle pretty closely, and my favorite insight from that reading is this. The big philosophical difference between Boeing and Airbus is that Boeing has long built airplanes "for pilots to fly." Airbus has aimed to build planes that anyone can fly. The predictable result is that Airbus has built market share especially in places where the supply of expert pilots is short. To answer this business threat, Boeing undertook its first effort at building a plane that anyone can fly and MCAS was the key piece of that effort. That it was a good business decision was proven when they attracted so many orders - orders that Airbus lost. But there was a terrible human cost.
So without attempting to lay blame in an area where I have only interest, but not expertise, I think Boeing, despite its eminence, was a beginner in this part of aircraft design. And they made a beginner's mistake. As
@Barry says, a single sensor is unforgivable when lives are at stake. Even two seems too few to me.
So the parallel to NICE and GET appears to me to be that GET was put in place by eminent amateurs, has had a terrible human cost, and must be removed from all policy documents as efficiently as possible. Because there is no regulatory body comparable to our National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) or FAA, this has become and will remain a political issue with a political decision. To some, this means it's time for diplomacy. To others this means it's time to call people names and to fight. I'm old enough to think we need both, and any wise advocacy organization should deploy both.