Connecting epistemic injustice and justified belief in health-related conspiracies, 2020, Annesley

Dolphin

Senior Member (Voting Rights)
I think it is possible it happens with some people with ME/CFS, both men and women

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352552520300839#!

Carel and Kidd note that such epistemic injustices can multiply easily in cases where a patient's primary symptoms are somatic [7], [8] as seems to be the case in conditions like Chronic Fatigue Syndrome [9]

Ethics, Medicine and Public Health
Volume 15, October–December 2020, 100545

Thoughts
Connecting epistemic injustice and justified belief in health-related conspiracies

Summary

In this paper, I argue that epistemic injustice in healthcare settings can contribute to patients’ rational mistrust of healthcare providers and the healthcare system, leaving these individuals vulnerable to rational belief in health-related conspiracy theories.

I focus on the ways in which two kinds of epistemic injustice – testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice – can contribute to specifically women's rational mistrust of healthcare providers, as well as a rational mistrust of the mainstream healthcare system more generally.

Once patients mistrust healthcare providers and/or the healthcare system, it seems rational for victims of these testimonial injustices seek out information from sources other than the mainstream healthcare system.

This leaves them particularly vulnerable to rational belief in potentially harmful health-related conspiracy theories, especially given the easy access we all have to health-related misinformation and conspiracy via the Internet and social media.

In this sense, then, experiences of epistemic injustice can contribute to individuals’ rational belief in health-related conspiracy theories.
 
Last edited:
Thanks for posting. I think that a lot of groups that are mistreated by authority figures can be left more likely to fall for kooky conspiracy theories... which is then used to justify their mistreatment.

I thought the phrasing was a little unclear in this abstract, and I think it's a bad idea to write as if a theory about a conspiracy is innately kooky. Conspiracy seems a prosaic part of life, even if they're largely just attempts to hide screw-ups. I expect that's cleared up in the full paper, which is on my list to read.
 
Last edited:
Thanks for posting. I think that a lot of groups that are mistreated by authority figures can be left more likely to fall for kooky conspiracy theories... which is then used to justify their mistreatment.

I thought the phrasing was a little unclear in this abstract, and I think it's a bit idea to write as if a theory about a conspiracy is innately kooky. Conspiracy seems a prosaic part of life, even if they're largely just attempts to hide screw-ups. I expect that's cleared up in the full paper, which is on my list to read.
Agreed. If it seems people really aren't helping you, then you start to look for deeper meaning about why that is. Especially when the people who are supposed to be helping are typically portrayed as caring and compassionate. It's only natural.
 
I'm not exactly sure what people are saying. Certainly the illness leads one to be more sceptical. But that doesn't mean there are not still theories that could justifiably be called conspiracy theories (that are incorrect) but some people could end up believing perhaps because they have become more sceptical e.g. whatever Mikovits' current theory about the pandemic, which at least a few people in the ME/CFS community believe or part believe it seems.
 
I'm not exactly sure what people are saying. Certainly the illness leads one to be more sceptical. But that doesn't mean there are not still theories that could justifiably be called conspiracy theories (that are incorrect) but some people could end up believing perhaps because they have become more sceptical e.g. whatever Mikovits' current theory about the pandemic, which at least a few people in the ME/CFS community believe or part believe it seems.

I guess that I'd want to distinguish more clearly between kooky conspiracy theories (Mikovits) and justified ones (the CIA worked to bring down Allende's democratically elected government, or more importantly, the Lancet can pull some real BS to avoid acknowledging problems with some of what they published with PACE, edit: And more banal stuff like companies fiddling their books, etc). I don't think it's healthy for 'conspiracy theory' to be used as shorthand for 'kooky conspiracy theory' in the way it sometimes is. Every time I try to make that point I fear that I make myself seem kooky!

edit 2: This paper seems to talk about 'justified conspiracy theories' as if a kooky theory is justified by the individual's past mistreatment, and I found some of the language a bit confusing.
 
Last edited:
Thanks for posting. I think that a lot of groups that are mistreated by authority figures can be left more likely to fall for kooky conspiracy theories... which is then used to justify their mistreatment.

I thought the phrasing was a little unclear in this abstract, and I think it's a bad idea to write as if a theory about a conspiracy is innately kooky. Conspiracy seems a prosaic part of life, even if they're largely just attempts to hide screw-ups. I expect that's cleared up in the full paper, which is on my list to read.

Conspiracy theory and the implication that they are always deranged was first used as a way of deflecting serious academic study of the assassination of Kennedy. It is not a crazy idea as such, Lincoln was assassinated as a result of a conspiracy.

As you say, some theories are kooky (and do not involve conspiracies!) It is the sort of misuse of terms we are accustomed to and like them, it leaves us with no language to deal with facts and work out what is happening in our lives.
 
Back
Top Bottom