Conclusion
I have highlighted two problems with how the concept of testimonial injustice might be applied to healthcare, using the example of CFS/ME. Although a useful concept which has already aptly shown how CFS/ME patients are vulnerable to suffering from epistemic harm, I have resisted claims that identify testimonial injustices where the epistemic problem can be just as plausibly explained by the medical professional exercising appropriate medical sensitivity within the context of a vast conceptual impoverishment. I have also argued that there is a problem with the idea of the CFS/ME patient as epistemically authoritative over their first-person lived experience, since their status as ‘knower’, of even their first-person lived experience, is highly complex.
I finished by suggesting that the process of gaining epistemic insight into CFS/ME ought to be deeply collaborative. Some researchers have suggested that, in psychiatry and medicine more broadly, there ought to be more collaboration between all ‘stakeholder groups’ (Fulford et al.
2014, p. 113). There are certainly promising avenues for further careful research into what the epistemic contributions of patients can reveal about CFS/ME. In the absence of a biomedical breakthrough, collaboration between patients, researchers, clinicians and medical professionals may prove to be the most effective way to enrichen the conceptual understanding of CFS/ME, empowering both patients and medical professionals.